What about pollution

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Submitted ⁨10⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago by Properal@hoot.goldandblack.xyz to Liberty@hoot.goldandblack.xyz


How Dirty Laws Trash The Environment

Negative Externalities and the Coase Theorem

The Free Market and The Environment Doug Bandow


Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, by Murray Rothbard

The Libertarian Manifesto on Pollution, by Murray Rothbard

If Property Rights Were Real, Climate-Destroying Companies Would Be Sued Out Of Existence by Nathan J. Robinson

Free Markets, Property Rights and Climate Change: How to Privatize Climate Policy | Graham Dawson

#Book Chapters:

Pollution chapter from THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM by David Friedman

Pollution chapter from For a New Liberty by Murray Rothbard


The reason why polluting is more profitable than not polluting is because the cost of pollution is not fully born by the polluter. This is called a negative externality.

We don't have to depend on altruism if we can get decision makers to bear the costs of their decisions more fully. Property rights are a very good way of internalizing externalities, in other words making decision makers to bear the costs of their decisions more fully.

This video explains several solutions to negative externalities and why property right is a very good one:

Negative Externalities and the Coase Theorem

An anarcho-capitalist society is expected to have a tort system. This is not far fetched since many pre-state legal systems were tort systems.

For an example of how lawsuits in a tort system can deal with externalities and how US laws have hampered the tort system in dealing with pollution see this video:

How Dirty Laws Trash The Environment

David Friedman suggests polluters might be sued as a class to reduce the number of individual lawsuits. There would still be huge transaction costs in each person suing individually. However I would expect tort claims to be transferable. Pollution tort claims may even be pre-sold by individuals to pollution insurance companies for promises to indemnify them for pollution damages. Insurance companies could then prosecute the tort claims to collect restitution or sell the tort claims to other prosecutors. Prosecutors would have an incentive to collect as much as they can from the tort claims, thus punishing the polluters and discourage future pollution. Concentrating the tort claims in the hands of a few prosecutors would reduce the number of suits.